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ABSTRACT
The problems the Dutch economy has experienced during the last seven
yeurs ure discussed, problems for Future development of the Dutch economy are
pin-poiiited, atid the political-economic debate in the Netherlands is surveyed.
Ten rules for sound government Finance are formulated and it is argued why the
politicul reality of budget cuts has led to crowding out of government
investment. The result is that government productive assets have not kept up
with the explosion of government debt, so the net worth of the public sector
has declined since 1982. Dutch monetary policy is geared towards the
discipline of not using seigniorage for government finance and pegging the
guilder to the Deutschemark, which is sensible given the large outstanding
stock of nominal government debt. Consumption smoothing suggests that given
liberalised capital markets investment should be financed through the current
account of the balance of payments, but little evidence can be found for this.
'fhis may be due to the "structural budget deficit" rule, which has been
implemented by Zijlstra.
7uly 1990
` The unabridged version of this paper "Fiscal policy, real wages and the
current account: The Dutch experience", was presented at the CEPR~Bank of
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participants and in particular to the advice of George Alogoskoufis end Ton
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Apart from a very short interval in 1982 the Netherlands have been
governed by a central-ríght coalition since 19~8. During the first four years
Mr. van Agt was prime minister. This coalition was secured with ~6 of the 150
seats in parliament. This period was marked by a sharp íncrease ín
unemployment and quickly deteriorating government finances. Halfway during its
term, the Minister of Finance, Frans Andriessen, quit after a quarrel in which
he insisted on further restrictions on government spending whereas his
colleagues did not give him sufficlent support. In 1981 a central-left
government took over, but was unable to agree on its policies. Government
finance deteriorated further and so did unemployment. New electiona in 198z
brought a gain of ten seats for the conservative-liberal party, VVD, and a
small loss for the centrist Christian Democrats (CDA). They formed a new
coalition under Mr. Ruud Lubbers as prime miniater and former banker Dr. Onno
Ruding as Minister of Finance. The program of thís government strongly
emphasised the need for sound government finances, end a recovery of the
market sector to beat the unemployment problem. The Lubbers government was
more convinced and convincing on its goals than its two predecessora. Hence,
Mr. Lubbers secured a second term of office after the election on 21 May, 1986
and was able to continue to focus on his policy of sound government finance.
In this election the CDA gained 9 seats and became the largest political party
with 54 seats. Despite the fact that the WD lost 9 seats (a return to 27
seats), a CDA-VVD coalition government continued. However, some fatigue with
this policy started to occur as budget discipline deteriorated during the
course of the second government of Lubbers and Ruding. The Labour Party was
with 52 seats the second largest political party, but remained out of office
again.
On the night of 2 May, 1989 the WD forced a break in the coalition over
the finance of the National Environment Plan, but this was probably the last
drop in the bucket as there had already been a period of dissatiafaction of
the VVD members of parliament with their ministers who had lost síght of some
VVD principles and had to sell their liberal souls to the CDA, and Mr. Lubbers
in particular, on too many occasions. Given almost twelve years of being out
of the office the leader of the PvdA, Mr. Wim Kok, can be forgiven when he2
joked that from now on the PvdA will celebrate the second, rather than the
first day of May. The election results of 6 September indeed show a loss for
tlie VVD-CDA coalition: slthough the CDA kept its 54 seats, the VVD lost 5
seats which gives only a one-seat majority in parliament to these two parties.
'fhe result was a CDA-PvdA coalition with Mr. Lubbers as prime minister and Mr.
Kok as Minister of Finance. This coalition still faces a number of unpleasant
constraints to device a new unemployment policy and to face up to the problem
of environment at a time when government finances are in a deplorable
situation.
There are many constraints for Dutch unemployment policy, but the main
ones are financial constraints and the associated lack of government
investment (cf., Keuzenkamp and van der Ploeg, 199oa, b). We strongly believe
that there are possibilities for an effective reduction of unemployment
despite perceived financial and other constraints. This is an issue that has
occupied the minds of politicians, journalists and economists in the
Netherlands during the last decade. Section 2 reviews the debate, pin-points
the areas of concern for the future development of the Dutch economy, and pays
attention to the composition of the pool of unemployed and hysteresis
phenomena, which together with the bad state of government finance are the
main problems facing the Dutch economy. Generally speaking, it reviews the
development of the Dutch economy in the eighties. Section 3 uses the theory of
tax smoothing to derive ten rules for sound government finance and argues that
most of these have been violated by Dutch governments of the last decade. In
fact, formation of productive government assets has not kept up with the
explosion of government debt so that the net worth of the public sector has
declined since 1982. Deficits have thus been used to finance transfers and
other forms of government consumption rather than government investment. This
tias been the unfortunate political reality of budget cuts in the Netherlands.
Section ~1 discusses the policies conducted by De Nederlandsche 8ank. The
rigid pegging of the guilder to the Deutschemark has bought an excellent
reputation for monetary discipline. Inflation is now the lowest in the OECD,
but this may heve been at the expense of an explosion of government debt. The
trade-off between discipline and giving up an independent instrument of
monetary policy is discussed. Section 5 points out that, given that capital
markets in the Netherlands are fully integrated with world capital markets,
investment should be financed through the current account of the balance of3
payments. In general, smoothing of consumption means that temporary falls in
income must be accommodated through current-account deficits, i.e. borrowing
from the rest of the world. Unfortunately, Section 6 showa that there ia
little empirical evídence of consumption smoothing for the Netherlends, aince
investment seems to be constrained by domestic saving. This worrying state of
affairs may be due to institutional restrictions or, alternatively, due to the
"structural budget deficit" rule advocated and implemented by Zijlstra in the
fifties and sixties. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The Dutch economy in the eighties
In our introduction we already mentioned the moat salient facts of the
Dutch economy in the last decade. High unemployment, a high government budget
deficit, a steady surplus on the current account, very low inflation and a
stable exchange rate vis-à-vis the Deutschemark characterised the Dutch
economy. Let us first turn to unemployment. Figure 2.1 shows unemployment
percentages (national definition) and the ratio of long-term unemployed to
total unemployment in one graph. The international economic depression that
started with the second oil crisis and the tight monetary policy in the US in
1979 led to an unprecedented rise in unemployment. The Dutch economy is more
vulnerable to external shocks than nearly any other Western economy. Moreover,
it relies heavily on petrochemical industries (Rotterdam). Furthermore,
profitability of the private sector had weakened during the seventies. Figure
2.2 shows how the profit share in the economy steadily decreased during the
seventies and picked up in spectacular fashion during the eighties.
Unemployment soared to a peak in 1983 of 12 per cent of the labour force
(standardised OECD figure). This was well above the EEC or OECD average,
despite very low participation rates (especislly for women). In the mean time,
long-term unemployment started to increase. The tide turned in 1985 with the
recovery of the international economy. As Figure 2.1 shows, unemployment
decreased but long-term unemployment stayed at a high level. In fact, the
minor decrease is due to the fact that a large share of long-term unemployed
is close to the age of retirement, hence time is an importent factor in the
solution to the lone-term unemployment problem. The main point, however, ia
that due to crowding out on the labour market the long-term unemployed are4
mostly not very skilled and have become alienated. They no longer exercise
downward pressure on wages. The appropriate response to such hysteresis
phenomena is to provide training and schooling programmes, but the self-
tmpu~;e~d l'inancial straight-jacket for government finances hes not allowed
this.
Tlie government's response to the unemployment problem was one of "benign
neglect". A centrist-conservative coalition was in power from 1978 to 198y
(except for the years 1981-82). The policy agenda had a reduction of the share
of government in the national income and of the government budget deficit on
top, the labour market was thought to solve its own problems. The government
urged for wage moderation to take a leading role in this process. As a result,
within a decade the share of labour in value added fell by almost fifteen per
cent. Unemployment benefits remained relatively generous, however, and had a
near open-ended character so that government finances deteriorated rapidly.
Furthermore, the Dutch government was opposed to active labour market
intervention by means of training and schooling or school-leave programmes.
Public spending on such items was negligible, also when compared with other
European countries (Keuzenkamp and Van der Ploeg, 1989. 199oa). As a result of
these factors, the long-term unemployed became more and more alienated from
the labour market. Their downward wage pressure became less important, so that
endogenous wage moderation became mere wishful thinking (see also Graafland
and Huizinga, 1988).
Reduction of both the share of the public sector and the budget deficit
was the single most important policy goal of the eighties. However, this
policy was not too successful. Figure 2.3 depicts the government debt, net
worth, and financial deficit of the public sector as percentages of GNP. The
improvement of world trade and hence the Dutch economy since the mid-eighties
led to a slight decrease in the deficit, but the debt~GDP ratio is still
rising. Worse, if we take a look at the government balance sheet, we see that
the net worth of the Dutch state collapsed since 1982 (Figure 2.3).
Effectively, government debt exploded without a corresponding increase in
productive government assets. The reason is that the financial deficits of the
government were used for transfers and other consumption purposes rather than
for investment purposes. Government investment halved between 1970 and 1989
(from 4.~ per cent of GNP in 19~0 to 2.3 per cent in 1989)!5
The excessive financial deficits violate public finance principles such
as tax-smoothing. The collapse of government investment erodes the long-term
strength of the Dutch economy (see Keuzenkamp and Van der Ploeg, 1990b).
Another potential distortion caused by the government's burden on the capital
market could be crowding out of private inveatment. However, ea real interest
rates are, due to the presence of fully liberaliaed capital markets, tied to
1'ureign and ia particular German real intereat rates, thís diatortion cannot
be blamed that easily on bad policies of Dutch governments.
'Phe share of government in the economy (consumption, investment and
wages, excluding credits and debt repayments) rose from 29.~ in 1971 to 35.9
in 1980 to a prospective 37 per cents of NNP in 1990. The inerease has been
slowed down or stopped, on the one hand (as mentioned before) as a result of
decreasing investment spending and on the other hand due to autonomous wage
moderation in the public sector. Whether this wage moderation is still
sustainable is an open question: for example, currently tensions are building
up in the health care sector where it is hard to attract new entrants to the
work force.
One motivation for the would-be policies of "sound government finance"
has been fear of international insolvency or a credibility crisis. The
solvency argument is for the Netherlands rather far fetched, though. Even
though net government worth plumbed, the government is far from insolvent (see
again the very conservative estimate of net government worth in Figure 2.3).
Furthermore, f'rom an international perspective the Netherlands are in a
favourable situntion of consíderable surpluses on the current account of the
balance of payments (Figure 2.4). Insolvency of the Dutch economy aeems to be
the very last problem to worry about. Exchange rate atability and inflation
are other ítems on which the Dutch economy scored well. Inflation belonga to
the lowest in the world, the guilder-Deutschemark rate ia close to becoming a
natural constant (Figure 2.5). Between 1980 end 1989 the guilder depreciated
slightly vis-à-vis the Deutschemark snd the dollar. The dollar appreciated
strongly between 1980 and 1985, but since then the bubble bursted. The yen
appreciated with nearly 75 per cent, the pound sterling and the French franc
depreciated 25 to 30 per cent.
On the ground of unit labour costs the Dutch economy has scored extremely
well during the last decade. Figure 2.6 shows how, during the seventiea, unit
labour costs (measured in national currencies) in the Netherlands rose6
slightly more than in Germany and the US, since 198o this pattern reversed.
Competitiveness improved also compared with Japan, given the appreciation of
the yen.
The economic agenda for the nineties is somewhat different from the last
decade, as a centrist-left wing coalition took over at the end oF 1989. The
sacial-democrats, the PvdA, had a program of "investing in the future", by
which it meant to recover government investment as well as recovering lost
human capital due to long-term unemployment. Still, the new coalition faces
severe budget constraints, the government accounting system does not
distinguish consumptive and investment spending. Furthermore, fears for
crowding out private investment by government borrowing are not yet gone. One
of the issues we discuss in our contribution is to see if these fears are
warranted, given the opening of international capital markets. We will
conclude that it is very hard to make a strong case for the imposition of such
a self-imposed external constraint.
Another item high on the policy agenda is further monetary and economic
integration. To see whether monetary integration imposes an external
constraint, we evaluate the recent past of tying the guilder to the
Deutschemark. Furthermore, we discuss how economic integration may lead to
international tax-wars, not unlike the devaluation-wars that characterised the
193os.
3. Short-sightedness in budgetary policies of Dutch governments
3.1 Ninancial constraints in the Netherlands
During the last twelve years the public sector deficits have led to a
steady rise in government debt and in debt service, as Figure 2.3 shows. After
the fall of the Christian-Democrat Labour coalition in 197~ government
finances started to deteriorate. The second oil crisis did not help to improve
government finances. Basically, increasing gas profits did not outweigh the
decline in tax benefits. Also remarkable is that the first Lubbers government
apparently was more successful in turning the tide than the second one; from
1983 to 1986 the deficit decreases but afterwards the government seems to7
loose grip on its expenditures. Some further details on government finance can
be summarised as follows:
- the public sector financial deficit fluctuated around 3X of NNI until 1978,
from this year onward the deficit rose steadily to 9.4X in 1983. In 1988 the
deficit still is twice as much as the average for the early seventies. The
public sector borrowing requirement includes repayment of debt and has
increased even more dramatically: from 1.6X in 1970 to 11.1X in 198~ end
10.5X in 1988.
- As a result, government debt increased from e eteady 40X during 1973-1977.
to nearly SOX of NNI in 1987 ( the most recent available figure).
- Interest payments on government debt therefore rose from roughly 2X to about
7X of NNI. For comparison, this amounts to 60X of the government wage bill,
and there is a serious threat that other expenditures are crowded out ea e
result of debt servicing.
It is therefore no surprise that a consensus has emerged in the Netherlands to
stabilise the government debt as a percentage ef national income, so that the
fall in debt service allows more room for productive government expenditures.
But the way in which this has been implemented has, in our view, not been
thought through very well. First we will take a look at the proposale made by
the Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte. According to the 1986 Government Agreement
the financial deficit should drop to 5}X by 1990. Afterwards, three
possibilities can be considered: (i) no further reduction in the financiel
deficits; (ii) further gradual cuts towards 3}X by 1994; (111) further gradusl
cuts towards 2}X by 1994. Roughly speaking, these three alternatives
correspond to a PvdA, CDA and VVD view, reapectively. A real growth rate (n)
of 2.5X and an inflation rate (rt) of 2X are assumed. Table 3.1 then shows that
a reduction in the finencial deficit of 0.5X - 0.~5X points per year is a
necessary requirement for the ratio of government debt to national income to
start falling during the period 1990-94. However, if there is no inflation and
nominal interest rates remain the same, the rise in the government debt ratio
will not be reversed unless the financisl deficit is eventuslly cut to 2}X,
The Studiegroep Begrotingruimte (1989) therefore makes a strong plea for the
financial deficit to drop to 2-3X of the national income. It also argues to
force these cuts in financisl deficits through something similar to the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law for the US.a
One can make a number of critical remarks about these proposals. To put
them in pcrspcctivc, consídcr a simple version of the government budget
constraint :
d. f-(rttn)d. f. g- T. id - zI (3.1)
where d end f denote government debt and the financial deficit, g and T denote
government expenditures (excluding debt service) and taxation, i denotes the
nominal interest rate on government debt, zl denotes the return on government
investment, n denotes inflation and n denotes the real growth rate. The first
criticism on the proposals to reduce f is very basic: there is no theoretical
consensus on how important deficits really are. Romer (1988) investigates the
costs of excessive deficits for the USA, and lists some views on the possible
effects of government deficits. On the one extreme is the supply-side and
Reaganomics view, according to which deficits resulting from reducing marginal
tax rates are highly desirable as they reduce distortions and will probably
pay themselves back in the long run thanks to higher incentives for economic
growth. Then there is the Ricardian view, according to which deficits are
rather unimportant. Rational agents enticipate higher future texation
resulting from an increase in current deficits and there will therefore be no
net effect on total spending, because the declíne in human wealth exactly off-
sets the increase in non-human wealth. The reason is that the present value of
future taxes is exactly equal to the rise in current taxes that would have
been necessary if the government would not let its deficit rise today, so that
the size of the deficit does not distort the behaviour of private sector
agents. Alternatively, agents save more in order to meet future tax claims.
Incidentally, the Ricardian view does not tell us anything about the size of
the government sector, only about the indifference between tax and debt
finance. Finally, there is the view that excessive deficits are distortionary,
as a current deficit places a burden of taxation on future generations which
seems "immoral". This argument (among others defended by Buchanan) is rather
hard to understand, except if the deficits are primarily used for current
conswnption aiid thus crowd out investment in human or physical capital. What
seems to be most importent is the effect of government spending on economic
growth, an issue that remains somewhat neglected in the discussion about9
optimn] government. defícits. Study of this issue can elso appraise the
possibly beneficial eff'ec[s of running counter-cyclical deficíts on long-term
economic prospects and growth.
These points lead to the second problem of the proposal of the
Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte. That is, the analysis fails to take account of
the intertemporal aspects of the government budget constraint (e.g., Buiter,
1985). The returns on assets have to be taken care of. Solvency of the
government finances and (3.1) yields:
d(t) t tf`[gc(s) i gI(s)] eXP[tfs- r(s')ds']ds -
kG(t) t tf~~T(s) ; zI(s)] exP~tfs r(s~)ds~lds (3.2)
where r~ id-n-n denotes the growth-corrected real interest rate, gc denotea
government consumption, gI denotes government investment, zI denotes the
return on government investment, and k~ denotes the public stock of capital.
The point is that, as far as government investment has the same return as the
market rate of interest, it can be netted out of the intertemporal government
budget constraint (3.2). The recommended reduction of the financisl deficit to
2}X (Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, 1989) dces not take full account of this
point; it makes a lot of difference whether the cut in the deficit is achieved
ttirough cuts in government consumption, through cuts in government investment
or through tax increases. In practice, the cut in the Dutch financisl deficit
has been accompanied by cuts in government investment which seems a rather
short-sighted policy. It is a pity that since 197~ Dutch government accounting
does not make a clear distinction between government consumption and
govec,nment investment anymore. The politlcal reasons are that minísters will
try to claim that all their expenditures are investments, so that budgetary
control may become more difficult. However, in practice government investment
has fallen dramatically since 1977 (see Table 3.2). Meny economists in the
Netherlands now advocate the "golden rule of government finance", which says
that firstly the government is allowed to borrow for investment purpoaes only
to the extent that they bear the market rate of return and secondly that the
amount of taxed levied should be high enough to finance government consumption
and the interest payments on the initial government debt ( gc(s) 4 1(s) d(s) -
T(s), s i t). The desired or sustainable financial deficit ia thua id . gI -10
zI. 't'able 3.3 provides some information on government interest payments
capital income and government investment. Since an importent part of the
proposed new government expenditures in the Netherlends are investment,
witness the National Environment Plan, it is of the utmost importance that
investigations into the intertemporal features of the government budget
constraint are initiated. Ideally, one would like to calculate an estimate of
the permanent deficit for the Netherlands (Buiter, 1985). This is the real
perpetuity equivalent of the discrepency in the government's ex-ante
comprehense balance sheet, i.e., the annuity value of the present value of
spending plans minus the net worth of the public sector, where net worth
equals public sector assets minus public sector debt plus the present values
of taxes and seigniorage and public sector capital formation. Privatisation of
public assets, such as the Dutch State Mines, or privatisation of student
loans do not affect net worth if the revenues from the sale (-nk(t)) exactly
match the discounted value of the future incomes associated with these assets
(-tfm pzI(s) exp[-tJs r(s')ds']ds). The Ministry of Education provides a very
sad example of how to reduce the financial deficit in the wrong way. Education
has been successful, since more people have participated in education in the
last years. The total budget has been the same, so the sum avaílable per
student has gone down. This seems short-sighted, because education can be seen
as an investment in human capital which to a large extent earns itself back.
Even more serious has been the 40X discounts given when student loans from the
past are immediately repayed. The idea is to help cut the financial deficit,
but it completely ignores that a future Minister of Education no longer
receives repayments. Such short-sighted measures fail to distinguish between
cash-flow and assets and illustrate the lack of financiel discipline that
began to prevail under the second Lubbers administration.
Thirdly, it seems odd that the desired financial deficit is independent
of the achieved inflation rate. Given that the De Nederlandsche Bank maintains
a fixed parity of the guilder versus the Deutschemark, an increase in
inflation in Germany will eventually lead to higher inflation in the
Netherlands. For example, if inflation rises to 4.5X, then equation (3.1)
shows that a financial deficit of 5.6X is warranted when one wants to
stabilise the ratio of government debt to national income at, say, 0.8. Hence,
it seems more sensible to advocate guidelines for the inflation-corrected11
financial deficit, f~ f-rtd, of, say, f- nd z 2X. If one substitutes f in
(j.l), one obtains
d-(i-n-n)d . g~. gI - ~- zI. (3.3)
From this it is clear that the impact of inflation on the debt ratio is zero
as long as the real interest rate, i-rt, and the ratios of government spending
and taxes do not change with inflation. However, there is a negative
correlation between the real interest rate and inflation, particularly on a
world scale (the Mundell effect) and thus higher inflation may, for a given
debt-GDP ratio, sustain a higher ratio of the primary deficit to national
income, gc4 gI. In addition, higher inflation may make it easier to cut the
ratio of government spending to national income. Government debt is not
indexed in the Netherlands. An unexpectedly low inflation therefore leada to
excessive gains for capital owners. The current low rate of inflation leads to
redistribution from tax payers to owners of government debt. These owners
coincide partly with the common taxpayer (pension funds own large suma of
government debt), but the extra gain for wealthy persons may be substantial.
Finally, it is true that the Netherlands have experienced a larger
explosion in government debt than most other OECD countriea (see Table 3.4).
Only Belgium, Italy and Ireland now have a greater debt-GDP ratio than the
Netherlands. However, the debt-GDP ratio in most other countries is under-
estimated because no provision is made for future pensions to be paid by the
government. For the Netherlands the government pension fund, ABP, has assets
of 145 billion guilders (and a future actuarial liability of the same amount),
which would reduce the debt-GDP ratio by almost 40X points. When one takea
account of this difference, the debt-GDP ratio for the Netherlands does not
seem so high compared with the other OECD countries.
Apart from the question whst the optimal size of government debt would
be, there remains the question what caused the recent increase in government
debts. In an international comparison, Roubini and Sachs (1989) enalyse this
question. One of their conclusions is that difficultiea of political
manngement in coulitíon governments account for some of the growth of
government debt ratios. Lack of consensus on economic policy may have
accounted for the increase in the debt ratio in the late seventies and early1z
eighties. Indeed, the first Van Agt-coalition (VVD and CDA) end the short-
lived second one (CDA and PvdA) lacked consensus on financial policies. These
governments also experienced the highest increase in government debt. Only the
first Lubbers administration was strongly directed to reducing the deficit.
The second Lubbers coalition suffered from the loss of the WD at the
elections, perhaps this loss of popularity induced WD-ministers to support
some popular expenditures thus leaving the task of improving government
finance to the CDA Minister of Finance, Mr. Ruding. Despite popular belief he
lost grip on government finance. The last years of the CDA-WD coalition
witness a remarkable lack of financial discipline, which can also be seen from
the fact that government spending is now already 9 billion guilders (2X of
NNI!) higher than planned in the Budget of September 1988 (Sterks, de Haan and
de Kam, 1989, see also the resulting discussion between them and Ruding in
Economische Statlstische Berichten).
We conclude that cuts in the financial deficit are desirable, but that in
practice the cutbacks have worsened the mix of government spending at the
expense of public investment in infrastructure, the environment and education.
The worsening of the mix already occurred before 19~7, when the revenues from
Dutch gas explorations were mainly used for consumption purposes. The
"government budget constraint" has never been a real constraint in the sense
of being binding. Solvency is not the problem of the Dutch government,
crowding out (of productive and other useful expenditure by interest payments)
is. Sound government finance is a necessary condition for being able to
implement environmental policies, labour market programs for reducing (long
term) unemployment, and so on.
The second link between government finance and the labour market goes via
taxation. From 1 January 1990 a simplification of the Dutch tax system ("Plan
Oort") will come into force. The main ideas are to reduce the bureaucracy of
filling in tax forms, to reduce the number of tax brackets from 9 to 4, to
combine the national insurance contributions rate with the first tax bracket
at a rate of 35X and a top bracket of 60X. and to abolish a number of tax-
deductable expenses. In addition, the plan is to implement tax cuts in the
order of 4.1 billion guilders or almost lOX of the total tax bill, but this
may be less when the Labour Party gaina a new coalition government and in any
cuse u substantial part of it is meant to be financed by cutting tax-
deducLuble expenses.i3
Table 3.5 shows that the wedge between producers' and consumers' wage is
the highest in the OECD and this explains why Dutch governments have been very
keen to reduce this. Due to the enormous scope for tax-deductable expenaes,
the average tax rate in the Netherlands is low compared with the rest of
Europe (but higher than for the US and Japan). Marginal tax ratea are,
however, very high in the Netherlands and the proposed reform of the syatem
will remove a large number of tax distortions. The problem is that due to the
very generous pension system the premiums are extremely high compared with
abroad, but then these lead to tangible benefits for those who pay for it.
Table 3.5 shows that the average wedge has risen steadily since the
sixties. The marginal wedge for a married employee with two children was about
73X when in Germany and the OECD it was only about 56x. However, the average
tax wedge (excl. social premium) was only 37.5x in the Netherlands, compared
with 39X for the OECD.
3.2 Ten rules for sound government finance
Dutch governments have traditionally given up an independent monetary
policy, because the guilder is firmly tied to the Deutschemark. In practice,
this means that Dutch inflation (rt) tracks German inflation (n`) very closely.
The disadvantages of tying one's hands to the policies conducted by the
Bundesbank is that the Netherlands cannot use monetary policy for
macroeconomic stabilisation and cannot use inflation taxes ea a source of
government revenues. The advantages are that the Netherlands tiea its hands to
the Bundesbank, so that it never uses an unanticipated inflation tax to
accommodate demands for higher wages or to erode the real value of nominal
government debt. The result is that in equilibríum inflation is lower than it
would be otherwise. Recently, some commentators have been sceptical about the
independence of the Bundesbank and thus some have argued that the Netherlands
should not follow the increases in interest rates at all times.
Tax smoothing follows from minímising the costs of tax collection subject
to the present-value budget constraint:
Min tJmt(s)2 exp[-tJs r(s')ds']ds (3.4)
t(s)14
subject to (3.2)-(3.3) (cf. Barro, 1979). If government investment beara a
market rate of return, one has:
i - r[d-kG] ~ gP
d-(Bc - B~) ; gl - zl ~ rkG
f-(Bc - 8~) t BI - zI t rkG .(R4n)d
where the permanent level of government spendíng is defined as





On the basis of the above equations, one can formulate ten rules of thumb for
sound government finance:
1. The amount of government debt is only of historical interest. The
interest burden on existing debt dces not crowd out other public
expenditure, as a high ratio of debt to GDP implies a high tax rate and a
high deficit.
2. IF policymakers choose to continue the current level of primary
expenditures (total expenditure minus interest and repayments of
principal), and if they do not want to make new investments, then it is
optimal to stick with the current debt~GDP ratio (d-0). The deficit will
be equal to the inflation-cum-growth-tax on existing debt (f-(rrtn)d).
3. Applying the theory leads to the result that a permanent decrease of
primary expenditures lead to an immediate decrease of the tax rate
without any effect on the deficit or debt-ratio. This means a balanced
decline of the public sector.
4. If expenditures are temporarily above normal (for example resulting from
unemployment due to a decrease in world trade), then it will be optimal
to leave the tax rate unaltered, running a higher than normal deficit,
increasing the debt rate (s~0). This is not the result of counter-
cyclical Keynesian policy, although it is similar to it, but follows from15
a tax smoothing policy. From this point of view, the rising debt-GDP
ratio around 198o might have been a sensible policy.
5. If, however, changes turn out to be permanent (for example, due to the
alienatíon of the long term unemployed), then texea muat immediately
rlso, whilst the growth in the debt-ODP ratio muat immodiately be atopped
(d-0). 'I'his pessim[sm seems to underlie the recent recommendationa of the
IMF to increase taxes in the Netherlands.
6. If policymakers choose to increase permanent spending in the future, they
will retire debt now, in order to create financial room for later years.
This may lead to political business cycles (see e.g., Persson and
Svensson (1989)).
7. Investment carrying a market rate of return can be netted out of the
government budget constraint. There is no reason why a government should
restrict investment expenditures in bad times, as happened in the
Netherlands (see Table 3.2). In fact, the political economy of budget
cuts is such that i t is easier to cut government investment than to cut
government current transfers.
8. If policymakers want to reduce primary expenditure, g, by xX per yesr,
than one can show that the permanent level of g, gP, lies below the
actual level: gP - g[(r-n)~(r-ntx)]Cg. Hence, optimal policy is to slow
down the decrease in tax rates and to run above-normal deficits.
9. If real interest rates are temporarily high (which seems to be the
current situation), than it will be optimal to finance the extra costa by
debt creation.
10. From a pure financial point of view, it does not make sense to sell
government assets in order to improve government finances.
3.3 Political economy of budget cuts
T'he main feature of Dutch government finance has been that tax smoothing
policies have not been used. The maín result is that in the process of making
the government's finances healthy, it has been easier for politicians to cut
investment than to cut transfers or government consumption. The result is that
the formation of productive government assets has not kept up with the
explosion of government debt, so that the net worth of the public sector has16
declined since 1982, the year in which the process of budget cutting under
CDA-leadership was meant to start (see Figure 2.3).
In other words, financial policy of Dutch government has been
characterised by en extreme degree of short-sightedness. One of the reasons
is, of course, that politicians are motivated by short-term re-election
considerations and thus prefer to spend rather than to invest. The minister of
finance, Mr. Ruding followed by Mr. Kok, is faced with a large group of
spending ministers and has not got enough power to force a healthy, far-
sighted finencial policy. Thís is why some people in the Netherlands now argue
for a nucleus-cabinet consisting of the prime minister and the minister of
finance, who can force such a number of spending ministers to take a longer
run view. Such a re-organisation of ministers and departments can, of course,
only happen at the time a new coalition government ia being formed.
An alternative proposal is to distinguish sharply between a current
account and a capital account in the government budget and to adopt a'golden'
rule of government finance: tax for permanent streams of government spending
nnd borrow for temporary increases in government spending such as productive
lnvestment projects. The problem is that all kinds of definitionul problems
wlll arise, because euch spending minister will cleim its expenditures as a
productive ínvestmunt. Some investmenta are unproductive (missiles, road in
Drente), whilst some consumption can be productive (education). The point ís
that it seems best to overcome short-run political restrictions and implement
the rules of Section 3.2. This requires either a nucleus-cabinet or an
independent accounting body which checks whether projects have a market rate
of return and thus warrant government borrowing.
4. Monetary discipline and the advantages of a firm EMS-anchor
4.1 Monetary policy in the Netherlands
'I'he Inte~sL annunl reporl. of De Nederlandsche Hnnk expresses sntisfactíon
l.huL Lhe Uelors CuwwlLtec urgues !'or a Europetnr System of Central Utuiks and
eventually economic and monetary union that differs very little from the
institutional structure of the Dutch central bank. On the whole all the main
Dutch political parties are strongly in favour of increasing the process
towards monetary unification in Europe and of establishing a European Central17
Bank that is independent of the fiscal authorities. De Nederlandsche Bank and
the Bundesbank enjoy, in contrast to the Bank of England and the Benca
d'Italia, autonomy in the sense that they conduct a policy quite independent
of the fiscal authorities. In other words, De Nederlandsche Bank will never
allow finance of the public sector deficit by printing money and, indeed,
seigiiiorage revenues in the Netherlanda have been either negligíble or non-
existent. This is in sharp contrast to the countries of southern Europe. For
example, central bank loans to the Treasury as a percentage of total debt are
in 1987 14.6X. 7.2.X, 7.2X and 32.SX for Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal,
respectively, end non-existent for the Netherlands end Germany (Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1989).
This is reflected in the fact that the main goal of De Nederlandsche Bank
is laid down by constitutional law to be a stable price level and thus zero
inflation. Table 4.1 shows that from this narrow perspective De Nederlandsche
Bank has scored extremely well. Inflation has been less than one per cent and
even lower than in Germany. Together with Japan, the Netherlands has the
lowest inflation rate in the OECD. De Nederlandsche Bank is very much
concerned about higher inflation because prices of non-energy raw materials
rose by more than 20X, strikes and other labour disputes are on the increase,
capacity limits are being reached, and productivity growth is levelling out.
llowever, one cun seriously ask whether a policy of near-zero inflation is not
a mixed blessing. It may be that some inflation, as long as it doea not get
out of hand, may be desirable as this may lead to less unemployment (as an
incomes policy may be easier to conduct) end as the stabilisation of the debt-
GDP ratio may be easier due to erosion of the real value of nominal government
debt, bracket creep in a progressive tax system and incomplete indexation of
benefits and salaries of civil servants (also see Section 3). Dornbusch (1989)
discusses the unpleasant side effects of the cut in inflation achieved in
Ireland and some of these may also be relevant for the Netherlanda. It is
clear that to a certain extent the optimal rate of inflation is a political
choice end may be different from zero. In any case, due to the emerging
dangers of inflation (witness the rise of bank credit by 14X in 1988 and the
rise of M2 in 1988, see Table 4.2), De Nederlandsche Bank has raised interest
rates and t~as even imposed a new (more subtle) version of the old instrument
of yuuiititative limits on bank lending. This may be a bit over-cautious,
becuuse Dutch consumers have on average a personal debt for consumption18
purposes of 1~00 guilders whilst German and US consumers have a personal debt
of 4000 and 6000 guilders, respectively. Lack oF credit availability for
consumption and investment purposes may slow down the expected increase in
economic growth. Given the fact that capacity in the Netherlands is lower than
needed for full employment, it is rather odd that investment should be slowed
down in this way. Credit constraints are unwarranted. A somewhat higher rate
of inflation is the least important economic problem that the Netherlands
currcntly hns to fcur, nnd anyway the higher German inflation will gradually
be followed by higher Dutch inflation except if De Nederlandsche Bank is
willing to appreciate the guilder vis-à-vis the Deutschemark.
This, however, conflicts with the secondary goal of De Nederlandsche
Bank, which is to maintain a stable exchange rate between the guilder and the
Deutschemark (see Figure 2.5). This is why in practice, the monetary policy of
De Nederlandsche Bank has followed very much the policy of the Bundesbank and
can therefore not be conducted in an independent fashion. The main reason is
that the Dutch economy has liberalisation of capital markets, so that
interest-rate differentials in favour of Germeny would lead to a flight of
capital out of the Netherlands and this would lead to downward pressure on the
guilder and thus eventually violate the exchange-rate target. Italy and France
have had capital controls and have been able to a somewhat independent
monetary policy, but this will no longer be the case on 1 July 199o when their
capital markets should be liberalised as well. Obviously, this asymmetry or
German hegemony in the EMS means that Dutch monetary policy and, eventually,
inflation are determined by the Bundesbank. The imbalances in the balances of
payments in Europe (deficits in Italy, Spain end now France, and surpluses in
the Netherlands and Germany) may cause tensions in EMS-parities, hence some
argue that a convergence of budgetary policies is necessary for stable intra-
European exchange rates. If headway is made on the proposals for economic and
monetary union made by the Delors Committee, then exchange rates will be fixed
and binding restrictions on national budget deficits will hold. Regional
imbalances in Europe will then persist for longer as neither the exchange rate
nor the budget deficit can be used for stabilisation purposes (given that
wages do not adjust immediately to ensure full employment and labour is
sufficiently mobile). It follows that Brussels will have a greater role to
plt~y in nlloviuLlnK ragíonul Lmbalrrnces, so thaL one of' the prices one pays
for monetury unificution is greater intervention on an EEC level. Given these19
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies for Europe in the future,
many Dutch politicians are concerned about delegating responsibilities about
these matters to a European System of Central Banks when the European
Parliament and thus democracy still has relatively little to say in these
matters.
We already mentioned in short the policy of De Nederlandsche Bank to
stabilise credit. In our views such a policy is out of place in the current
situation. Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) study the importance of credit. Even with
an accommodating credit policy of De Nederlandsche Bank there remain special
problems in the Dutch economy that may make credit constraints binding in
significant parts of the economy. Table 4.3 shows the development of
consumptive credit since 1980. In real terms, in 1988 credit was etill lOX
lower than eight years before.
4.2 Unanticipated inflation end nominal government debt
Now we want to discuss why it is adventageous for the Netherlande to tie
its hands so much to the policies of the Bundesbank. A change in German
interest rates usually leads to a change in Dutch interest rates on the same
day and consequently the guilder - Deutschemark rate is kept within very small
bands and Dutch inflation is very close to German inflation. The best way to
do is to contrast three outcomes: (i) a dependent central bank which is not
committed to the EMS and forced to the discretion outcome (D); (ii) an
independent central bank which is not a follower in the EMS end who can
benefit from rules (R); and ( iii) an independent central bank firmly
commmitted to the EMS (E). Case (i) corresponds to Britain, case (11) to
Germany and case (iii) to the Netherlends. Ignoring investment, the government
budget constraint can be written as
d' (r'ne-n)dt ec-T- (rttn)m (4.1)
where r denotes the ex-ante (growth-corrected) real interest rate (given by
tastes and technologies) and m denotes the constant money-GDP ratio.
Effectively, the quantity theory of money and the Fisher hypothesis have beenzo
assumed so that inflation is the excesa of monetary over real growth and
iiominal interest rates go up and down together with expected inflation. The
government solves the public-finance problem (cf. Mankiw, 1987):
Min tfm[T(s)2 t grt(s)2] exp[-tfsr(s')ds']ds
rt.i
(4.2)
subject to (4.1). Hence, the government minimises the dead-weight losses
caused by conventional taxation and by inflation taxes but both are needed to
finance a given stream of public goods.
Case (iii) was discussed in Section (3.2); nE - 0 and tE - rd t g~ - nm.
Case (i) implies that the central bank is unable to manipulate expectations of
the private sector and thus must take ne as given. In equilibrium expectations
are not falsified, n- rte. Discretion yields gnD -(mtd)TD and TD - 0. Tax and
seigniorage revenues are smoothed over time and go up and down together.
Substitution into the present-value budget constraint gives:
tD -~rm m4d ~~g~ , rd - nm~ C iH ( TE (4.3)
rtD - ~'m;m'd J lgc }
rd - nml ) nH ) „E - O. (4.4)
Under rules the central bank has sufficient reputation and can thus assume R-
rte when it optimises. Discretion leads to higher inflation and lower taxes
than rules, because the private sector knows the central bank has an incentive
to renege by levying a surprise inflation tax and wiping out the real value of
debt service and thus assumes that the central bank will extract more
seigniorage. Hence, rules yields higher welfare than discretion.
The crucial comparison is between outcomes (i) and (iii). The latter,
i.e. tying the hands of De Nederlandsche Bank to the Bundesbank, yields a
higher welfare than the former, the case of a dependent central bank, if
2 2
(g-m )d )(ptm )m (Gros, 1988). One is more likely to be s committed member of
the EMS when one has a high level of public debt (as then the incentive to
impose a surprise inflation tax is large) and when the priority one attaches
to fighting inflation relative to the costs of tax collection is high. Both of
these conditions ere satisfied for the Netherlands, hence it is no surprise
ttiat the Dutch are such loyal members of the EMS. Even though the monetaryu
discipline argument has been made with reference to the real value of nominal
government debt, it could have been made just as easily for the real value of
nominal wage contracts (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). The story can also be
extended to analyse the case for an independent EuroFed (van der Plceg, 1990).
5. Investment, government deficits and the current account
5.1 Saving and consumption
Table 5.1 shows the relative performance of the Dutch economy as far as
real growth is concerned. Average growth during the period 1982-88 was 1.~X
(excl. energy revenues about 0.2X higher), but throughout the OECD it was 3X
and throughout the European countries of the OECD growth it was 2.3X. It is
ttrus considernbly worse ttian the average performance for Europe and for the
OECD and comparable with the modest performance of Germany. More recently,
Dutch growth has been picking up. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that this has been
associated with relatively large current-account surpluses for the
Netherlands. The main reason is that savings of the private sector have risen
from about lOX in 1980 to 16X in 1988 and this has more than off-aet the
borrowing of the public sector. Viewed ín this light, the public-sector
deficits do not look too bad. A consequence of this has been very low growth
in real private consumption; less than 1X Per annum during the period 1980-88.
The growth in real income during this period of 1.3X per year has been mainly
achieved through a growth in real exports of 3.5X, but despite a decline in
government investment of 3-5X per year during this period. This has been due
to the disproportionate burden of government cuts on investment and due to a
substuntial improvement in the competitive position of the Dutch economy.
The contrast between the Dutch and the British economies in recent years
is striking (see van der Ploeg, 1989). The UK has experienced a consumption-
led boom leading to more thsn 4X growth recently, whereas the Netherlands has
had very modest growth originating almost entirely from the substantial
increase in exports arising from the recent recovery in world trade (see Table
5.4). Inflation in the Netherlands is very low, whereas in the UK inflation is
now surging to above 8X. Private savings (incl. pension funds) in the UK are
much lower than in the Netherlands, whereas the UK is now paying offz2
government debt and the Netherlands still has substantial public sector
deficits. Hence, the UK has substantial current-account deficits end the
Netherlands has substantial current-account surpluses. It follows that there
is considerable room for demand expansion in the Netherlands, whereas the UK
is a prime example of over-heating. The mirror image of the above picture is
that the Netherlands invests a lot abroad, but this does not generate jobs at
home.
5.2 Smoothing of private consumption
Let us now consider an economy, which attempts to use the current account
to smooth consumption:
Min tfm[c - c(s)]2 exp[-tfsr(s')ds']ds (5.1)
c,j
subject to the present-value constraint for the nation as a whole,
gP i cP t jP s yP , ra c (5.2)
the intensive form production function, y- f(k), and the capital accumulation
equation,
k - j - (bfu)k. (5.3)
where c, c, a, j, y and k denote the actual and the desired value for private
consumption, net foreign assets, private investment, national income and the
capital stock (all as percentages of GDP), respectively, and b denotes the
depreciation rate. Equation (5.2) requires solvency of the nation and follows
from integration of the identity that the current account corresponds to the
increase in wealth of the netion.
The result is that private consumption is smoothed over time, c- 0, that
tlie u~arginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital, f'(k) -
rtbtn, and that the current account is in surplus when actual income exceeds
permanent income or when the actual level of government spending is less than23
the permanent level, ca - y- yp t g~ - gc - j. When tsxes are also smoothed
over time (see Section 3.2), one obtains (Roubini, 1988):
ca - -def ~ (Y-YP)(1-t) - j (5.4)
where def denotes the inflation-adjusted government deficit. Hence, private
investment needs to be financed through a deficit on the current account of
the balance of payments.
6. Capital mobility and the external constraint
In our review of the Dutch economy during the eighties we already claimed
that an external "solvency constraint" is currently not relevant for the
Netherlands. The current account of the balance of p~yments shows a
considerable surplus on average. (Figure 2.4) If, however, capital markets are
less open than casual inspection suggests, another external constraint may
hamper the Dutch economy. We already showed that the government budget deficit
is excessively high (given the fact that debt is not allocated to investment
spending), furthermore that private investment is relatively low. If capital
markets are closed, the deficit may have crowded out private investment.
Hence, it is important to assess whether this has been the case indeed.
Furthermore, Dutch central bankers worry about the fact that an increasing
share of Dutch government debt may be held by foreigners. This fear is
misplaced if international capital is mobile and individuals are forward
looking: in that case Ricardian Equivalence implies that whether a given
stream of primary government spending is financed through taxes or debt is
irrelevant and furthermore that placement of government debt abroad or at home
is irrelevant. Finally, if capital is relatively mobile this has implications
for the optimal structure of taxation.
Let us turn to the data. Figure 6.1 shows gross direct international
flows. The solid line is direct Dutch investment abroad, the broken line is
foreign direct investment in the Netherlends (both percentages of GNP). Both
lines, in particular Dutch investment abroad, slope upwards. Figure 6.2 showa
the total of net long-term capital streams (direct investment plus equity and
bonds, figures presented for the non-monetary sector of the economy). Again24
both curves, volatile as they are, slope upwards. The recent increase of
holdings of Dutch assets by foreigners is a result of a small positive
interest differential between the Netherlands and Germany together with a
strong guilder (low inf'lation). However, this effect may be attenuated
somewhat due to the presence of a liquidity premium, because the capital
market of the Netherlands is much smaller than that of Germany. The increases
in direct investment seem to anticipate "1992~~.
Other direct evidence on growing international capital mobility is
available by comparing onshore and offshore interest rates. Figures 6.3 and
6.4 show onshore and offshore 3-month interest rates for the Netherlands and
Italy respectively. The message is quite clear: the Netherlands (where capital
controls hardly exist) has nearly identical onshore and offshore rates,
whereas Italy (with strong capital controls) has large divergences. Increasing
mobility should not necessarily lead to larger capital flows, but should
eventually lead to convergence of rates of return on capital.
Despite these direct sources of evidence for increased openness of
capital markets, there is an empirical puzzle known as the Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle that contradicts this evidence (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980 or FH for
short). As argued in the previous section, perfect capital mobility together
with forward looking behaviour of economic agents implies that the current
account of the balance of payments is used as a smoothing device. Temporary
fluctuations in income should not lead to significant changes in spending
(consumption and investment), since these shocks are absorbed by the current
account. A temporary fall in income thus leads to a trade deficit, rather than
to a trade surplus as in the ususl Keynesian story. A permanent (additive)
shock to income should lead to an immediate adjustment of consumption, leaving
saving and investment unaltered (hence, the current-account is not affected by
this shock). The implication of this theory is that consumption and investment
for the economy as a whole should be uncorrelated. FH and Feldstein and
Bacchetta (1989) find quite different empirical evidence, though. This does
not necessarily contradict perfect capital mobility, as the intermediate case
shows. That is, persistent productivity shocks will lead to higher savings and
higher investment as long as capital becomes more productive. In this case,
even under perfect capital mobility one can find positive savings-investment
correlations.25
Figure 6.5 presents the time series for gross savings, gross investment
and the current account. If the current account works as a smoothing device,
then FH expect a value close to zero of the "savings retention factor" or a1:0
in the regression J~Y - a0 t ai(S~Y) In fact, FH find values of al close to
one using data for 16 OECD countries. Note, by the way, that if the null
hypothesis of perfect capital mobility were true, investment ahould be the
exogenous variable (determined by the international rate of return).
Símultuneity is just one of the econometric problems that hampers the FH line
of research (estimation by 2SLS does not lead to different findings, however).
Other problems occur if one does not use cross-section data but time series
(Ghosh, 199G). As the Dutch savíngs and investment ratios do not clearly ahow
evidence of a unit root or cointegration, we ignore problems related to
cointegration. Estimatíng with Dutch time series for 1951-1989 provides a
savings retention coefficient (ai) of 0.90 (s.e. 0.15), with an RZ of 0.50 and
a DW of 1.08. Estimation with 2SLS gives essentially the same results. A first
problem of this result is the apparent dynamic misspecification. F'urthermore,
we expect a lower value for al in more recent periods than in the beginning of
our sample. Estimating for subperiods leads to degrees of freedom problema. An
alternative is to use a Bayesian updating procedure or recursive least squarea
(RLS) instead, which suggests an increase over time instead of a decrease of
ai over time. This is surprising, because one would have thought that the
increasing degree of liberalisation of capital markets should with the passing
of Limc have led to a fall in ai.
A mirror image of the savings-investment correlation ia the current
uccount-suvings correlation (as S~CAtJ). In the following, we will take
investment as the independent variable (consistent with the null hypothesia of
full capital mobility). If we regressed the current account on inveatment
one obtains a coefficient of -0.44 (s.e. 0.09), very different from the
expected value of minus one. Of course, this estimate is troubled by the same
problems as our earlier findings. One possible way out is to differentiate
between private and government behaviour. This also has the advantage that it
will be possible to see if the government really crowds out private investment
if it runs a deficit. If the permanent income hypothesis holds true, then
private savings depend on the after-tax difference between current and
permanent income. Government savings, or minus the government budget deficit,
depend on either tax smoothing or explicit offsetting government policies.26
Roubini (1988) estimated equation (5.4) which corrects for the government
deficit, assuming that GNP is a random walk so that yp-yt. Our estimates are
not significantly different (differences m~y result from the way of correcting
the deficit for the inflation tax) and are -0.43 (s.e. 0.33) for the deficit
term and -0.68 (s.e. 0.39) for the investment term (R2 - 0.21, DW - 0.41,
estimation period 1971-1985 as in Roubini). These results are closer to the
perfect capital mobility prediction but still far from satisfying. Estimates
using the complete sample period (1951-1989) lead to estimated parameters
somewhat closer to zero (not really surprising as the 1950s and 1960s had
probably lower capital mobility than the years used by Roubini). Problems with
dynamic misspecification (revealed by the DW statistics) and "perverse"
instability (revealed by updating or RLS regression) point out that we have
not yet captured a satisfactory model for capital mobility in relation to
savings and investment.
Let us proceed with an equation along the lines of (5.4), but drop the
assumption that GDP Follows a random walk. Instead, consider the case where
CDP is an integrated AR(1) process:
AYt - ~ 0 Yt-1 ~ Et
In that case it can be shown that
Yt - Yt - - 1 ~ (Yt - Yt-1)
where ~~ l~ltr. Estimation with real GDP from 1956 to 1989 gives





If we take r- 0.025 (hence m- 0.976), we obtain Yt - Yt -- 0.42
(Yt-Yt-1)'
Estimating equation ( 5.4), using this result, gives
ca - 0.14 - 0.58 J~Y - 0.12 def - 1.15 (1-t)(Y-Y )~Y
(0.03) (0.13) (0.13) (0.55)27
R2 - 0.36: Dw - 0.71: x2(4) z 19.7
Sample 1955-89
It is clear that tt)ese results do not improve upon the earlier findinge.
Dynnmic' misvpeclficnt.íon aLíll ls a problem, the estimatos for the
rucl'I'IclcnLs uru iwun wiirva Lhun ín an eyuation wlth s random-walk
tipeciflcaLion for incomc. '1'here still are other ways to test for the exiatence
of full capital mobility combined with forward-looking behaviour. Ghoah
(1990), for example, shows that the current account should predict ("Granger
cause") the change in net cash flow of a country (oNCF ~ A(Y-I-G), where G
equals government spending, below we will discuss the own implications of
government spending. We were unable to find conclusive evidence for this
hypothesis.
A possible explanation for the lower (in absolute value) than expected
coefficient of the deficit in the current account regression is given by
Summers (1988). He suggests that the government might have the explicit
intention to fill the private savings-investment gap. In a cross-country
study, Summers finds a coefficient of 0.72 in a regression of the deficit in
the net savings gap: DEF - 0.72 (S - I ). Hence, Summers argues that 72x net net
of the savings gap is explicitly offset by the government's finance policy.
Indeed, in the Netherlands there has been a well-known deficit rule due to
Jelle Zijlstra (former minister of economic affairs, finance, prime minister
and central banker), known as the "structural budget deficit" rule according
to which the government budget deficit should match the savings surplus of the
private sector, minus 1.5X of GDP intended for capital transfera to Third
World countries (development aid). Hence, if this policy has been pursued in
practice indeed, we would expect:
def - - 0.015 4 ca
Estimating this relation provides




Various efforts to obtain better results by introducing dynamics did not lead
to improvements. Furthermore, estimation for subsamples gave essentially the
same result. Using instrumental variables also did not make much difference. A
further test to infer whether the structural current account surplus
determines the deficit or reversely is to perform s"Granger causality" test.
Taking for granted the many well-known objections to interpreting this kind of
tests as a sign of (lack of) causality, we were unable to conclude that either
the current account "Granger causes" the deficit or reversely. Our test is
based upon Geweke et al. (1982). The first test is for "causation" of the
deficit by the current account:
YA - CO ; 1-~4 aifDYF,t-i ; i~i~ifYA,t-i
Estimating this equation for 1955 to 1985 and testing if the ~i, i--4,...-4
jointly differ from zero leads to an F-Statistic F(4.1~) - 0.81. Hence, there
is no sign of "Grenger causation" of the current account on the deficit.
Similarly, a test for the reverse "Granger causation" leads to a F-Statistic
of o.34, again there is no sign of "causation".
Another reason for the counter-intuitive estimates of (5.4) is a
violution of the tyx smoothing policy by the Dutch government. Indeed, lt ís
hurcl tu r~rKuc thnL Lhc ffnnncial paliclea during thu eightiea werc even
rumutely consis Wnt wlth u tnx smoothing policy as argued in Sectlon 3.
According to the various regression results presented above, the
recurrent conclusion seems to be that, despite being an open economy, the
Netherlands do not fully profit from international capital mobility. The
current account does not seem to fulfill its role of a smoothing device. If
this conclusion were warranted, then increases in government budget deficits
would tend to crowd out investment. This is what Feldstein and Bacchetta argue
as well. They estimate an investment equation with the budget deficit and
private savings as independent variables for a panel of 13 OECD countries. We
did the same for the Netherlands, resulting in:
J~Y - 0.00 - 0.~o DYF . 0.86 YS
(0.05) (0.16) (0.18)29
R2 - 0.46; DW - 1.06 sample 1951-89
This result is very similar to Feldstein and Bacchetta. If we are satisfied
with this result (and below we will argue that we are not), then the
conclusion should be thet, indeed, government deficits crowd out private
investment. Still, how can it be that in such an open economy as the Dutch we
are apparently faced with capital constraints? We have to atretch our
imagination to find a satisfactory answer. FH mention a few capital markets
"imperfections" that may cause less than perfect capital mobility. One factor
they mention is nationalistic portfolio preferences, i.e. Dutch inveators like
to invest in the Netherlands. It is hard to see how such preferences can
sustain in an otherwise open and competitive market. Furthermore, some actors
may have such preferences but the issue is what happens in the margin. Zf the
marginal investor is more "rational" than there is no external (capital
mobility) constraint. The same holds for institutional rigidities. Zt is true
~htit, for exi~mple, Uutch pension funds are not ellowed to invest as much as
they like abroad (similar constraints apply to other European pension funds).
Table 6.1 shows that these funds have relatively few foreign assets and many
government bonds. The civil servants pension fund, ABP, invested about two
third of its capital in government loans, whilst private funds invested nearly
40X of their funds in government. ABP invested only 2X in equities, but
private pension funds reach nearly 8X. Apart from institutional barriers and
forced saving, risk aversion explains much of this investment behaviour. The
situation is changing, though, as these funds increasingly invest in equity as
well as abroad (some institutional limitations are dropped in the near
future), on the other hand more foreign investors start to buy Dutch
government bonds.
Let us now criticize the earlier findings. Things change drastically as
soon as we control for the effect of world trade. Both private investment (PI)
and the government budget are strongly correlated with world trade, es the
following two regressions clearly show:
DYF - U.o2 - 0.06 wr - o.i4 WT-1 i 0.82 ID~-J-1
(o.oo,) (0.05) (0.05) ( 0.08)ll3G
R2 - G.76: x2(1) - 0.26; x2(4) - 3.1
PI - 0.07 ~ 0.18 Wf Y
(0.02) (0.07)
f 0.28 WT-1 a 0.51 IYI,-1
(0.07) (0.09)`
R2 - 0.65: x2(1) - 0.22; x2(4) - 3.5
(both samples 1951-89).
Hence, private investment and the government budget deficit are both affected
by a third variable, world trade, leading to spurious regressions in earlier
equations. If we add the deficit, we obtain
YI - 0.05 . 0.15 OYF . 0.19 wr . 0.3o wr-1 . 0.56 IYI,-1
(0.02) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)l
R2 - 0.66: x2(i) - 0.16; x2(4) - 6.27
The impact of the deficit on private investment looses its significance and
even changes in sign. As we have seen from Table 3.2, there occurred a strong
decline in both private and public investment, that started in the early
seventies. Two major showdowns occurred just after the two oil crises. Private
investment as percentage of GNP was at an absolute minimum of 15x in 1982,
after which a slow recovery started. Government investment has halved and
remained in decline, even with a few grand projects (building new dikes) going
on. The decrease in investment, in addition to an increase in labour supply,
must have led to a decrease in the relative level of full capacity. If
anything, government investment policy only made things worse. As mentioned in
Section 3 the government budget constraint does not discriminate between
consumptive and productive government expenditures. In times of budget cuts,
it is easier to stop making new investments than to reduce government
consumption (as Sncking or cutting salaries for public servants invariably
leads to strikes and political embarrassment).
Figure 2.2 portrayed the development of the share of profits and the
share of investment in the national income. It is obvious that the last seven
years of wage moderation by the trade unions have resulted in a dramatic fall31
of the share of labour from over 90X in 1982 to about 77X seven years later.
The resulting increase in profits combined with the recent recovery in world
trade and demend, has led to a recovery of investment during the last few
years. This is consistent with a Kaleckian and Keynesian explanation of
private investment behaviour. However, it is interesting to note that the
recovery of profitability has not led to a full recovery of inveatment. This
corresponds to a kind of hysteresis in investment. Nevertheless, if the
Kuleckiun story of investment holds true, there ia only a limited role for the
r.urrenL uccount us a smoothtng devíce.
7. Concludín,g remarks
The Dutch economy is making some progress towards making public aector
finances more healthy, but this has gone at the expense of too little físcal
stimulus. The Netherlands cennot expand demand unless the rest of Europe, in
particular Germany, does the same, so the Dutch should be strongly in favour
of a coordinated supply-friendly fiscal expansion for Europe. Since public
investment has declined dramatically in the process of cutbacks, it is
essential that the government invests more heavily in infrastructure,
education and the environment. Financial discipline has not been good, because
government investment has fallen dramatically and actual spending has been
much higher than planned spending. There is some evidence that monetary policy
in the Netherlands is too tight and, gíven the large public debt, a slight
increase of inflation to, say, 3 or 4x per year may not be as bad as De
Nederlandsche Bank suggests. Since private sector savings in the Netherlands
more than off-sets public sector borrowing (witness the substantisl current-
uccount surpluses), there seems to be room for an expansion of demand. The
growth in 1989 in the Netherlands has been aubstantiel, but these extra joba
have been mainly of a low-quality and part-time nature and have not been
enough to keep up with the increase in labour supply (resulting mainly from
increased participation). As a result, unemployment in the Netherlands has
remained persistently high. The growth in output and jobs have been mainly the
result of the recovery in world trade, helped with the wage moderation that
has taken place since 1983, so that one cannot give the credit to government
policy. The wage moderation has been mainly forced through high unemployment,
but given the alienation of the long-term unemployed and the presence of32
hysteresis it is not clear that wage moderation will continue in the future.
There is a case for more government investment in permanent schooling and re-
training programmes, especielly as these may to a large extent be netted out
of the government budget constraint. An application of the "golden rule" of
govec~nment finance would permit such policies. In addition, more attention
should be paid to "sabbatical leaves" end permanent schooling as they are a
much more fruitful policy than the cuts in hours worked (advocated by part of
the trade union movement). The Dutch direct tax system is highly inefficient,
because it combines high marginal tax retes with low average tax rates. The
proposed reform of the tax system will go some way towards remedying these
inefficiencies. Social premiums are high in the Netherlands, but then these
are off-set by a generous pension system. It is not clear what the adverse
effects of this on unemployment are.
It is not clear that investment in the Netherlands is financed through
the current account. This may be due to legal constraints on foreign
investment by pension funds, but more generally it is an indication that
neither tax smoothing nor consumption smoothing have been of much importance
in the Netherlands. In other words, the Netherlands is characterised by two
self-imposed external constraints, a rigid guilder-Deutschemark rate and
investment being too closely tied to domestic saving.
References
Barro, R. (1979). On the determination of public debt, Journal of Political
Economy, 87. 5. 940-971.
Buiter, w.H. (1985). A guide to public sector debt and deficits, Economic
Policy, 1, 13-79.
Dornbusch, R. (1989). Credibility, debt and unemployment: Ireland's failed
stabilization, Economic Policy, 8, 173-209.
Feldstein, M. and C. Horioka (1980). Domestic saving and international capital
1'luws, Economic Journal, 90, 314-329.
Feldstein, M. and P. Bacchetta (1989). National saving and international
investment, NBER Working Paper No. 3164, Cambridge, MA.
Geweke, J., R. Meese and W. Dent (1982). Comparing alternative tests of
causality in temporal systems, Journal of Econometrics, 21, 161-194.33
Ghosh, A.R. (1990). "international capital mobility and optimal current
account behaviour: An empirical investigatlon:, Princeton Uníversity
Discussion Paper No. 50.
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1989). Confidence crisis and public debt
management, NBER Working Paper No. 2926, Cambridge, MA.
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1988). The advantage of tying one's hands: EMS
discipline and central bank credibility, European Economic Review, 32, 5,
1G55-1G82.
Graafland, J.J. and F. Huizinga (1988). Modelling a wage equation for the
Netherlands: A cointegration approach, Central Planning Bureau Memorandum
No. 51, The Hague.
Gros, D. (1988). Seigniorage versus EMS discipline: Some welfare
consideretions, Working Document No. 38, CEPS, Brussels
Keuzenknmp, H. und F. van der Ploeg (1989). Zeven verloren jaren? De mialukte
sunering, intermedtnír, 25. 34. 5-11.
Keuzenkamp, H. and F. van der Ploeg (1990a). "Perceived constraints for Dutch
unemployment policy", in C. de Neubourg (ed.), The Art of Full Employment:
Unemployment Policy in Open Economies, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Keuzenkamp, H. and F. van der Ploeg (1990b). Het Grote Onvermogen: Een kritiek
op de gangbare analyse van financieringstekort, schuld en
begrotingsruimte, ESB, 75. 3764, 608-612.
Mankiw, N. (1987). The optimal collection of seigniorage: Theory and evidence,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, 327-341.
Persson, T. and L. Svensson (1989). Why a stubborn conservative would run an
deficit, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 325-345.
Ploeg, F. van der (1989). "Tien jaar van voorspoed en ongeluk: Mrs. Thatcher
en de Britse economie (Ten years of progress end unhappiness: Mrs.
Thatcher and the British economy)", Socialisme en Democratie, 6, 191-195.
Ploeg, F. van der (1990). Budgetary aspects of economic end monetary
integration in Europe, Discussion Paper No. 9037, CentER, Tilburg
University.
Romer, D. (1988). what are the costs of exceeaive deficíta, NBER
Mncroc~conomica Annunl 1~88, M1T Presa, Cambridge, MA.
Houbini, N. (1y88). Current account and budget deficita in an intertemporal
model of consumption and taxation smoothíng. A solution to the "Feldstein-
Horioka puzzle?", NBER Working Paper No. 2773, Cambridge, MA.34
Roubini, N, and J. Sachs (1989). Political and Economic Determinants of Budget
Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, European Economic Review, 33. 9G3-
933.
Sterks, C.G.M., J. de Haan and C.A, de Kam (1989). De erfenis van Ruding,
Economische Statistische Berichten, 1898.
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1988). Credit rationing, and its implications for
macro-economics, unpublished manuscript.
Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte (1989). Nsar Gezonde Overheidsfinanciën,
presented to Parliament.
Summers, L. (1988). Tax policy and international competitiveness, in J.
Frenkel (ed.), International Aspects of Fiscal Policies, NBER Conference
Report, Chicago University Press.35
LIST OF FIGURFS
2.1 The unemployment rate and long term unemployment
2.2 The profit share and investment
2.3 Key figures of public finance
Z.il '1'he surplus on the current account
2.5 The Deutschemark - guilder exchange rate
2.6 Unit labour costs of the Netherlands end some competitors
6.1 Direct international investment flows
6.2 Long term international investment flows
6.3 The onshore and offshore 3-month interest rate of the Netherlands
6.4 The onshore and offshore 3-month interest rate of Italy























Figure 2.2: The profit share and investment
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20






































1954 1962 1970 1978 1986
yearFigure 2.5: The D-mark - guilder exchange rate
1950 -55 ~ ~~ "965 1970 1975 1980 1~~~; "99~
































Figure 6.1: Direct international investaent flows
1964 1968 1972 1976 198~ "984 1988 1992
direct Dutch investment abroad, r of GNP
- - - direct foreign investment abroad
year





O '964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992
- increase Dutch foreign assets (X GNP, non-banking sector) Source: Central Bank Annual Report, Table 6.3
-- increase foreign assets in the Netherlands (X GNP, non-banking sector)N~THON
NETHOFF ---
Figure 6.3: 1t~e onshore and offshore 3-month interest rate of the tretherlands
-r-~--,--T-~--T-~--r~-r-~---r~-T~--r~-,-T~~T--rT-~~-,--T-,~-i r~~ ~ --r--TT~-
R J D J R,. ~,; R J 0 J R J 0 J R J D J R J D I J R J D J R J" J R-- J R ! 0 J R J
1979 195J lad] 1982 19B3 1984 1985 19B6 loP7 1968 1989Figure 6.4: The onshore and offshore 3-month interest rate of Italy
]TRON
1TROFF
8 ~Ti~ ~~r ~--r.. -r.T
RJOJRJOJRJOJRJOJ'RJOJRJOJRJOJRJOJRJOJRJOJRJ










1954 1962 ~970 1978 1986
~ ~ . . gross investment~CNP
gross savings~CNP
- - - - Current accounL~GNP47
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Alternative scenarios for the government debt ( as a percentage of GNP)
3.2 Investment in the Netherlands (as a percentage of GNP)
3-3 Government interest payments, capital income and investment
3.4 International comparison of government debt, 1980-90
3-5 An international comparison of taxes and contributions on labour income
4.1 Annual inflation rates in the consumers' price index
4.2 Annual growth rates in money stocks
4.3 Consumptive credit in the Netherlands
5.1 GrowLh of real CNP~CUP in the OECD area (percentage changes from pcevious
period)
5.2 Savings in the Netherlands ( as a percentage of net national income at
u~arket prices)
5-3 Current balances of' OECD Countries ( percentage of GNP~GDP)
5.t1 Crowth in Lhe volume of world trade
6.1 Investment behaviour of pension funds and insurance compeníes48
Table j.l: Alternative Scenaríos for the Government Debt ( as a percentage of
national incame)
Financial deficit ~. n- 4.5X
1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2005
(i) 5}X from 1990 69.1 73.7 75-4 77.0 78.5 80.0 81.4 92.5
(ii) 3}x from 1994 69.1 73.7 74.9 75.5 75.6 75.2 74.8 71.8
(iii) z}z from 1994 69.1 73.7 74.6 74.8 74.2 72.8 71.5 61.4
Financial deficit R t n- 2.5X
(i) 5}x from 1990 69.1 75.1 78.1 81.0 83.9 86.7 89.4 113.4
(ii) 3~X from 1994 69.1 75.1 77.6 79.5 81.0 81.8 82.7 90.2
(iii) 2}x erom 1994 69.1 75.1 77.3 78.8 79.5 79.4 79.3 78.5
Source: Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte (1989).
Table 3.2: Investment in the Netherlands (as a percentage of GNP)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Private investment 23.1 16.7 18.3 17.1 18.7
Covernment investment 4.7 3-9 3.3 2.6 2.3





1y77 251.180 8,390 10.870 9,280
1978 269,660 9.310 10,900 9.640
1979 z85.940 10,300 12,800 9.800
1980 303.630 12,540 15,900 10,970
1981 316,z7o 15,710 21,120 11,100
1982 330,620 19,010 21,970 10,620
1983 342.390 21,710 23.550 1o,i9o
1984 358.560 23,870 25.830 11,190
t985 375.990 26,140 29,010 10,940
iy8ó 385.440 26,580 22,720 10,180
1987 386.470 26,420 15,680 9.960
Source: Columns 3 and 4: CBS, National Accounts 1983, Table 12, 1987, Table
R.S. Column 5: CBP, CEP 1989, B.1. All in millions of guilders.
Table 3.5: An International Comparison of Taxes and Contributions on Labour
Incaune
Taxes and social Average Total Top income tax
premiums tax rate marginal rate
(X of GDP) tax
wedge"
1965 1983 1983 1983 Actual Proposed
Sweden 36 50 61.7 73 75 60
Netherlands 34 47 37.5 73-5 72 60
Norway 33 47 50.4 63 56
Belgium 31 45 48.1 61.7 72 55
France 35 45 47.6 59.7 56.8
uK 31 38 39 54-5 40
Germany 32 37 36-6 57 56 53
us 26 30 28.2 42.6 28
aapan 18 28 19.1 39-9 88 66
Total OECD 27 37 39 55-8
Source: OECD Economic Studies, No. 7 and 8.
" Married worker with two children, incl. indirect taxes and employers'
contributions.50
Table 3.4: International Comparison of Government Debt, 1980-90.
Gross debt (X of GDP) Net debt (X of GDP)
1980 1986 1990 1980 1986 1990
Belgium 77 122 127 69 1111 17~
Italy 59 88 lo0 54 86 98
Netherlands 46 74 90 25 48 64
Canada 45 67 71 12 34 38
Japan 52 69 65 17 z7 23
us 38 51 50 20 30 29
Sweden 45 68 50 -14 16 -2
spain 19 48 49 8 30 31
Denmark 34 59 49 7 28 17
France 37 46 48 14 25 28
West Germany 33 42 45 14 22 25
~ 55 53 39 48 46 32
Noz,.rav 56 38 34 7 -16 -20
Total 42 56 55 22 33 33
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1988c.51
Table 4.1: Annual Inflation Rates in the Consumers' Price Index
t983 i984 1985 1986 i987 1988
Relgium 7.7 6.3 4.9 1.3 1.6 1.9 Denmark 6.9 6.3 4.7 3.6 4.0 4.5 Genmany 3-3 2.4 2.2 -0.2 0.2 1.6
Greece 20.2 18.4 19.3 23.0 16.4 14.0 Spain 12.2 11.2 7.8 8.8 5.3 5.9 France 9.6 7.3 5.9 2.7 3,1 (3,1)
Ireland 10.4 8.6 5.4 3.8 (3,1) 2 7 Italy 14.7 10.8 9.z 5.8 4.8 (5.4)
Luxembourg 8.7 6.5 4.1 0.3 -0.1 1.9
Netherlands 2.7 3.2 2.3 0.3 (-0.2) 1.0
Portugal 25.1 28.9 19.6 11.8 9.3 (11.7)
Onited Kingdom 4.6 5.0 6.1 3.4 4.1 6.8
Europe (12) 8.6 7.4 6.1 3.6 2.9 (4.4)
os 3.2 4.3 3.6 1.9 3.7 4.4
JaPan 1.8 2.4 2.0 0.7 (0.0) (0.9)
Source: European Economy, January and February 1989
Table 4.2: Annual Growth Rates in Money Stocks
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
eelgium (M2) 8.7 5.9 7.6 11.5 10.5 8.1 Denmark (M2) 25.5 17.8 15.8 8.4 4.4 1.9
Germany (M3) 5.3 4.7 5.1 6.8 6.0 6.8
Greece (M3) 20.3 29.4 26.8 19.0 24.8 24.6
Spain (ALP) 15.9 13.2 12.8 11.4 14.0 10.9
France (M2) 13.7 9.8 6.0 4.1 4.3 4.2
Ireland (M3) 5.6 10.1 5.3 -1.0 10.9 4.6
Italy (~t2) 13.3 iz.i 10.8 9.4 8.3 8.4) Netherlands (M2) (10.7) (6.8) (10.5) 4.5 3.9 10.7
Portugal (L) 16.8 24.6 28.9 25.9 16.8 15.0
United Kingdom (tat3) 11.1 lo.l 13.4 19.1 zz.9 20.3
EuroPe (12) (m) (I1.4) (9.8) (9.6) 9.7 (10.i) (9.8)
us (rt2) 11.7 8.2 8.1 9.1 3.4 5.6
JaP~ (M2) 7.3 7.8 8.7 9.2 10.8 (10.4)
Source: European Economy, January and February 1989Table 4.3: Consumptive credit in the Netherlands
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
I~i~ivlduJ by bwika 4,3;8 h,hh~i 4.j97 1~.378 4,4y3 11,3y6 11,677 5.238 5.~78 5.869
uuwr 7.590 8.u93 1.921 7,442 7.W5 6.640 6.486 6.836 7,37~ 7,7?6
~t,u~i ~t,q28 ~2,538 12,318 ti,82o ii,49R t1.o36 ii,163 12,074 13.05~~ i3.575
In real cerma 101 100 93 84 80 75 74 80 87 9u
(]9au - 1W)
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank annual report 1988, Table 2.3 ( millions of guilders)
Price index: CPB, CEP 1989, C.1.
Table 5.1: Growth of real GNP~GDP in the OECD Area (percentage changes fram
previous period)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
us 1.9 -2.5 3.6 6.8 3.4 2.8 3.4
JaPan 3.7 3.1 3.2 5.1 4.9 2.4 4.3
Gennany 0.0 -1.0 1.9 3.3 1.9 z.3 1.8
France 1.2 2.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.3
utc -1.2 1.8 3.7 2.2 3.5 3-2 4.3
ltaly 1.1 0.2 1.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.1
canada 3-7 -3-2 3.2 6.3 4.6 3.2 4.0
Belgium -1.4 1.5 0.2 2.2 0.9 2.0 2.1
Denmark -0.9 3-0 2.5 4.4 4.2 3.3 -1.0
Ireland 2.6 -0.7 -1.6 2.0 -0.1 -1.3 4.8
Luxembourg -0.2 1.5 3.0 6.5 3.8 2.9 2.0
Netherlands -0.7 -1.4 1.4 3.2 2.4 2.1 1.3
Total OECD 1.6 -0.4 2.7 4.9 3.4 2.7 3.3
OECD Europe 0.2 0.8 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 198853
Table 5.2: Savings in the Netherlands (as a percentage of net national income
at market prices)
t979 198o ty81 1982 1983 198h 1985 1986 1987 1988
Private sector 11.6 10.6 12.0 14.7 14.6 15.7 14.9 16.0 15.6 15.6
Public sector' 0.6 1.0 -0.4 -2.7 -2.2 -1.2 0.1 -1.3 -2.2 -2.7
Current account -1.4 -1.6 2.5 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.8 3.2 2.0 2.0
Capital account" 0.1 0.3 -1.3 -2.2 -2.4 -2.4 -3.2 -5.5 -1.5 -2.0
Source: Centraal Economisch Plan, 1988
' Including social ínsurance institutions
" Private and public sectorS4
Table 5.3: Current Balances of OECD Countries' (percentage of GNP~GDp)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Unlted Stetes" -2.y -3.3 -3.6 -3.1 -2.6
Tapan" 3.7 4.4 3.6 2.9 2.6
Germany" 2.6 4.2 3.9 3.8 3,3
France -0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6
United Kingdom 0.9 0 -0.4 -1.3 -1.6
Italy -0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
canada -U.2 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -2.z
Total of the above countries -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
Austria -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.8 2.6 1.8 1.4 1.2




-1.3 -1.3 -2.5 -2.5 -2.9
-9.8 -4.2 -2.7 -3.5 -4.1
-4.2 0.4 -2.6 -3.9 ..
Ireland" -4.3 -3.1 1.7 2.0 1.2
Netherlands 4.3 2.6 1.5 1.7 1.9




1.9 3.9 1.8 -o.z -z.2
1.7 1.8 0.1 -0.7 -1.4
-1.2 0.7 -0.6 -1.1 -1.4
Swltzerland 5.6 5.0 4.1 3.4 3.1
Turkey" -1.9 -2.6 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3
Total of smaller European
countries 0.8 0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.6
Australia -5.5 -5.9 -4.5 -3.4 -3.1
New Zealand -6.3 -5.5 -3.9 -2.6 -2.6
Total of smaller countries -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0
Total oECD -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Four major European countries 0.8 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.5
OECD Europe 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.2
E~ 0.8 1.4 0.9 U.6 0.3
Total OECD Zess the US 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.0 0.7
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, June 1988.
' Figures for 1988 and 1989 are projections.
" Percentage of GNP55
Table 5.4: Growth in the volume of world trc~de
1977-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
5-6 2.0 0.3 -2.3 1.8 8.3 3.1 4.1 6.z 9.0
Source: Central Planning Bureau. CEP 1989.




Loans and Sector, and Foreign Govern-
Bonds Equity Mortgage Assets ment Total
Insurance
Companies 27.4 10.2 42.1 9.3 37.5 126.5
Private Pension
Funds 4z.6 15.5 31.z 31.3 74.5 195.1
Civil Servants
Pension Fund 30.0 3.1 15.7 4.3 92.9 146.0
Total loo.o z8.8 89.0 44.9 204.9 467.6
P.M. NNP 1988 401.2
Source: De Nederlarrdsche Bank annuel report 1988, Table 2.2 (billions of
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